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Automatically Dismantling Online Dating Fraud
Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Matthew Edwards, Claudia Peersman,
Gianluca Stringhini, Awais Rashid, and Monica Whitty
Abstract—Online romance scams are a prevalent form of mass-
marketing fraud in the West, and yet few studies have presented
data-driven responses to this problem. In this type of scam,
fraudsters craft fake profiles and manually interact with their
victims. Because of the characteristics of this type of fraud
and of how dating sites operate, traditional detection methods
(e.g., those used in spam filtering) are ineffective. In this paper,
we investigate the archetype of online dating profiles used in
this form of fraud, including their use of demographics, profile
descriptions, and images, shedding light on both the strategies
deployed by scammers to appeal to victims and the traits of
victims themselves. Further, in response to the severe financial
and psychological harm caused by dating fraud, we develop a
system to detect romance scammers on online dating platforms.
Our work presents the first fully described system for au-
tomatically detecting this fraud. Our aim is to provide an
early detection system to stop romance scammers as they create
fraudulent profiles or before they engage with potential victims.
Previous research has indicated that the victims of romance scams
score highly on scales for idealized romantic beliefs. We combine
a range of structured, unstructured, and deep-learned features
that capture these beliefs in order to build a detection system. Our
ensemble machine-learning approach is robust to the omission of
profile details and performs at high accuracy (97%) in a hold-
out validation set. The system enables development of automated
tools for dating site providers and individual users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The online romance scam is a prevalent form of mass-
marketing fraud in many Western countries [1], [2], [3], [4].
Cybercriminals set up a false user profile on dating websites or
similar online platforms (e.g., social networking sites, instant
messaging platforms) to contact potential victims, posing as
attractive and desirable partners [5]. Once contact has been
established, scammers apply a range of techniques to exploit
their victims. In many cases, they engage in a long-term
fictitious romantic relationship to gain their victims’ trust and
to repeatedly defraud them of large sums of money [6].
Recently, the FBI [7] reported a total loss of $85 million
through online romance scams in the US. On an individual
level, IC3 complaint data showed that an average of $14,000
was lost per reported incident of online dating fraud. Fur-
thermore, many victims find it difficult to seek support due to
being left traumatized by the loss of the relationship, and suffer
from the stigma of being an online dating fraud victim [4].
Despite the magnitude of this type of cybercrime, there is
an absence of academic literature on the practical methods for
detecting romance scammers. Previous work has mentioned
that online dating sites are employing both automated and
manual mechanisms to detect fake accounts, but do not
discuss the specifics [6], [8]. Some dating sites are known
to use static information such as blacklists of IP addresses
or proxies to identify alleged scammers [9]. However, these
countermeasures can easily be evaded through e.g., low-cost
proxy services using compromised hosts in residential address
spaces. Dealing with online dating fraud is challenging,
mainly because such scams are not usually run in large-scale
campaigns, nor are they generated automatically. As a result,
they cannot be identified by the similarity-detection methods
used for spam filtering. Dating websites are designed for con-
necting strangers and meeting new people, which renders the
concept of unsolicited messages—a key element of most state-
of-the-art anti-spam systems—strategically useless [6]. Finally,
romance scammers will send a series of ordinary, personalized
communications to gain their victims’ trust. These communi-
cations highly resemble messages between genuine dating site
users. In many cases, the actual scam is performed after a
few weeks or months and after communication has moved
to other, unmonitored media [5]. Therefore, it is essential to
identify romance scammers before they strike.
Given that the online dating profile is the launching point
for the scam, it is important to learn a) how scammers craft
profiles to draw in potential victims and b) if there are
any distinguishing features of these profiles which can be
identified for automatic detection. This is a distinct problem
from the detection of Sybil attacks or cloned profiles [10],
existing methods for which typically rely upon graph-based
defences or markers of automated behaviour, neither of which
are applicable here. Previous research has indicated that the
victims of romance scams score highly on scales for idealized
romantic beliefs [11]. Thus, a scammer profile might be
expected to exploit these notions of romance when designing
their dating profile. To the best of our knowledge, no prior
work has analyzed how these notions of romance appear as
traits in dating profiles, or whether these traits can be leveraged
to build a scammer detection system.
In this paper, we present a machine-learning solution that
addresses the detection of online dating fraud in a fully
automated fashion, which is widely applicable across the
dating site market—including by the users themselves. More
specifically, we combine advanced text categorization and
image analysis techniques to extract useful information from a
large dataset of online dating user profiles and to automatically
identify scammer profiles. The key contributions of our work
are as follows:
• We leverage a large public database of romance scammer
profiles, in combination with a large random sample of
public profiles from a matched online dating site to un-
derstand the characteristic distinctions between scammer
profiles and those of regular users.
• We design three independent classification modules
which analyze different aspects of public profiles.
• We synthesize the individual classifiers into a highly
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accurate ensemble classification system. Even when parts
of the profile information are omitted, our system can reli-
ably distinguish between scammer and real user profiles
(F1= 94.5%, ACC= 97%), resulting in a solid solution
which should generalise well to other dating sites.
To enable replication and foster research we make our
tool publicly available at https://github.com/gsuareztangil/
automatic-romancescam-digger. This paper proceeds as fol-
lows. In §II we describe our dataset and the observed char-
acteristics of real and scammer dating profiles. In §III we
discuss the architecture of our ensemble classification system.
In §IV we detail the division of the data for training, test and
validation purposes, and present our results, before discussing
related work in §VI and concluding with final remarks in §VII.
II. CHARACTERIZING DATING PROFILES
Though variations exist within the market, typical dating
profiles consist of at least one image of the user, some basic
information about their key attributes, and a self-description
used as a ‘sales pitch’. Our approach to scam detection focuses
on these common profile components, which are present across
the market. In what follows, we compare the characteristics
of real dating profiles with those which are designed by
scammers, and detail what we can learn about scammer targets
and strategies from the differences between them.
A. Data
The data we use comes from a dating site datingnmore.com,
and the connected public scamlist at scamdigger.com. This
dating site distinguishes itself from the market on the basis
of its lack of romance scammers. It screens its registrants and
members to identify scams, which are then listed openly to
warn the general public and anyone whose likeness may be
being appropriated by the scammers. Our dataset combines an
exhaustive scrape of the scammer profiles and a large random
sample of one-third of the ordinary dating profiles as of March,
2017. In total, our dataset is composed of 14,720 ordinary
profiles, and 5,402 scammer profiles.
All data used in this paper is publicly available, with no
requirement to register, log in or deceptively interact with
users of the dating site to collect it. Nevertheless, in the
interests of privacy, no personally identifying information is
revealed in this paper, including that of reported scammers. To
enable replication of our results, we make available two scripts
which implement the data-harvesting process that created our
dataset. This enables replication while allowing dating site
users to “withdraw” from future study by removing their
profile from public view. The research was approved by the
relevant Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The attributes available for scammer profiles and genuine
profiles are slightly different. The scamlist profiles include
the IP address, email address and phone number used by the
scammer when registering, along with bookkeeping informa-
tion on the justification used for the decision that a profile is
a scam. These variables are not present in the public member
information. Contrarily, there are attributes visible on public
member pages which were not duplicated to the scamlist for
scammer profiles. For the purposes of informing discriminative
and widely-applicable classifiers (see [12] for a comparison of
dating site elements) we focus on those attributes which are
available for both types of profile:
• Demographics: Simple categorical information relating
to the user, such as age, gender, ethnicity, etc.
• Images: One or more images of the user. The dating site
mandates that only images showing your own face may
be used as an avatar, and users are usually motivated to
include pictures that illustrate their hobbies.
• Description: A short textual self-description from the
user, in which they advertise their key traits and interests.
Different techniques are required to extract meaningful
information from these profile attributes. In the following,
we cover the preprocessing required for each group, and the
notable features of scammer and real dating profiles.
B. Profile Demographics
Dating site demographics act as a filter for users. At the
crudest level, most users will be searching for a particular
gender of partner. Typically, age and other information about
a person will also play a role in their match candidacy. In
response to such filtering, users may withhold or lie about
certain demographic characteristics to make themselves seem
more desirable to potential partners. For most real dating
site users, any such deceptions or omissions must be low-
level, as they intend for a personal relationship to result [13].
Romance scammers, however, have no expectations of a real
relationship, and are highly motivated to engage in this form
of deception. The information they present in profiles should
thus in no way be taken as an accurate measure of their true
demographics. However, the attributes selected in their profiles
can reveal much about their overall strategies for attracting
potential victims for romance fraud, and even, implicitly, who
their targets may be.
Age, Gender, Ethnicity and Marital Status: The gender
distribution of both real and scam profiles was identical:
about 60% of profiles are male. This highlights that romance
scamming is not a gender-specific problem, in line with the
understanding of previous studies [5]. The average age of real
and scam profiles was around 40 in both cases. However, the
distribution of ages differs significantly. Within real profiles,
the average age of male and female profiles is the same, but
within scam profiles the average age of females is roughly
30, and the age of male profiles is roughly 50. This bi-
modal distribution around the mean of real profile ages points
at scammer understanding of gendered dating preferences—
men here prefer younger, physically attractive partners, while
women prefer partners with higher socio-economic status, who
may be older [14].
As reported in Fig. 1a, the ethnicities claimed by scammers
are intriguing. The high proportion which claim to be white is
unsurprising, as this is the ethnicity of most of their intended
victims. However, the dating site has a large Hispanic popula-
tion, but the scammers rarely pretend to be Hispanic. Instead,
the second most popular ethnicity amongst scam profiles is
Native American, a very small population amongst the real
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(a) Profile ethnicities (b) Profile marital statuses
Fig. 1: Ethnicity and marital status, with 95% CIs
data. This would seem to reflect some criteria of desirability
which perhaps is related to the fact that dating scams are often
targeted at a US-based population.
As Fig. 1b displays, while both real and scam users were
mostly single, scammers prefer to present themselves as
widowed rather than any of the other categories. This is
unsurprising, as female scam victims often talk about such
a trait being a successful strategy to gain their sympathy and
trust [5]. Less desirable statuses such as divorced or separated
were underrepresented in scam profiles, and scammers were
far less likely than real users to be married or in a relationship.
Occupation: There were a wide variety of occupations,
several being misspellings or rephrases of others. Responses
were grouped into 45 occupation areas. Tables Ia and Ib
reflect the major occupation areas for male and female profiles
respectively. In both cases, approx. 15% of real and 4%
of scam responses were not well-captured by occupation
groupings, this category of ‘other’ reflecting a long tail of
unique occupation responses. For both males and females,
the most frequent occupation response for real profiles was
“retired”, a value which was extremely rare in scam profiles.
Table Ia presents a strong bias of scam profiles towards
military and engineering professions. The desirability of male
military profiles is a bias romance scammers are already well-
known for exploiting [5]. The masculine and high-status image
of engineering might similarly explain its use by scammers.
Other professions listed display a similar approach: business
(in many cases, the raw response being “businessman”),
medicine (i.e., “doctor”) and contracting professions which
might lend themselves to explanations for why a person
would later require money to be sent overseas. As shown in
Table Ib, female scam profiles present less clearly suspicious
TABLE I: Topmost occupation areas by presented gender
(a) Male profiles
Real Freq Scam Freq
other 0.15 military 0.25
self 0.07 engineer 0.25
engineer 0.07 self 0.10
tech. 0.05 business 0.06
student 0.05 building 0.06
retired 0.05 other 0.04
building 0.05 contract 0.04
service 0.04 medical 0.03
transport 0.04 manager 0.02
manual 0.03 sales 0.02
(b) Female profiles
Real Freq Scam Freq
other 0.15 student 0.21
student 0.10 self 0.16
carer 0.08 carer 0.10
service 0.06 sales 0.07
clerical 0.06 military 0.05
teacher 0.06 fashion 0.04
retired 0.05 business 0.04
self 0.04 other 0.04
medical 0.04 finance 0.03
housewife 0.03 service 0.03
Fig. 2: Worldwide location of scammer and real profiles
occupations, with ‘student’ and ‘carer’ groups leading. The
appearance of ‘fashion’ further down the list does speak
towards a desirability bias (e.g., “model”). The ‘military’
group makes a surprising appearance—no real female profiles
claimed such a role—even more oddly, this occupation is
selected mostly by female profiles aged over 40. This may
be an attempt to generalize the “military scam” used in male
profiles, but its strategy is unclear. For the most part, female
scam occupations fit with previous suggestions that scammers
are exploiting the desirability of a young, dependent female
partner in low-paying or non-professional work [5]. This role
naturally lends itself to an explanation for why a person might
need financial support.
Location: The location data reported in profiles was usually
given to the city level, although the specificity did vary,
particularly within scammer profiles. The original location
responses were geocoded to provide lat/lon points, and country
of origin factors. As shown in Fig. 2, the scam profiles mostly
claim to be in the US or Western Europe. Corresponding with
the earlier observation of a low incidence of claimed Hispanic
ethnicity, scammer profiles rarely claim to be located in Latin
America or Spain, despite a large real user population from
these areas. This suggests that a substantial Spanish-speaking
population of the dating site is not (yet) being targeted,
possibly due to language barriers.
With regard to the targeted national locations, the concen-
tration of scammer profiles in the US is highly notable, with
nearly three-quarters of scam profiles with given locations
claiming to be resident there. The secondary targets were the
UK and Germany. More plausibly honest responses, such as
Ghana, may be reactions to the dating site’s methodology
of comparing IP geolocations to declared location [8]. The
distribution suggests scammers are targeting rich, Western and
mostly English-speaking nations.
Scammer profiles most often declared locations which were
well-known Western cities. The most frequent city response
was New York, being roughly 13% of all scammer locations,
followed by Los Angeles (7%) and then London, Dallas,
Miami, Houston and Berlin. Selecting well-known and large
cities avoids the need for intricate knowledge of a smaller
city/town and makes it easier for a scammer to remotely obtain
enough detail to appear plausible. This approach also enables a
travel narrative—commonly, a wealthy businessman originally
from a large city but currently away on business.
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(a) Original. (b) Fake Image. (c) Original. (d) Fake Image.
(e) Original. (f) Fake Image. (g) Original. (h) Fake Image.
Fig. 3: Certain contexts such as the military, academic or the
medical one are often used to attract vulnerable users1.
C. Image Recognition
The use of images plays an important role in online dating
sites. The right set of pictures can both maximize the number
of people interested in a profile and help users to limit
interactions to a certain type of person. This can be leveraged
by criminals to reach a larger number of potential victims and
to attract vulnerable users.
Scammers typically select the face of a publicly available
image and build a fake persona with other images from
different desirable contexts. The military context is recurrently
exploited [5] as certain vulnerable victims seek a ‘knight in
shining armor’. Other popular contexts are the academic and
medical ones, where scammers pretend to be practitioners,
students or patients. Fig. 3 shows how a scammer faked an
image of a high-ranked military officer to impersonate a third
party. We next study how to extract semantics from images to
better understand the choices made by both legitimate users
and scammers when selecting profile pictures.
As mentioned earlier, the data available in our dataset for the
scammers category and the real category differs slightly. For
the scammers dataset there are samples available with multiple
images per profile. Conversely, for the real dataset there is
usually only one picture per profile. Overall, we found images
in approximately 65% of the profiles2. While the proportion of
profiles with images is equivalent in both types of categories,
the absolute number of images per profile is larger in the
scammers dataset. Specifically, there are 0.65 images per
profile in the real dataset and 1.5 in the scammers one. Note
that there may be variation in the distribution of images
per profile category across different dating sites. However, in
our dataset, fraudsters tend to share more information than
legitimate users.
A common theme found in both types of profiles is the
use of pictures where users not only show their physical
appearance, but also convey a sense of the hobbies or interests
the person holds. Fig. 4 shows four examples of images found
in our dataset where subjects are, for instance, riding or sailing.
As it is relevant how scammers present themselves in
their profile pictures, we next elaborate on how to extract
1Publicly available images from https://www.romancescam.com/
2Without including the default site avatar: .
(a) Real. (b) Real. (c) Scammer. (d) Scammer.
Fig. 4: Sample of images from our dataset. Faces from real
profiles have been redacted to preserve the anonymity.
TABLE II: Topics found across profiles with images.
Type Real Profiles Scam Profiles All
Male 57.75% 63.76% 60.48%
Groups 0.50% 2.22% 1.28%
Children 5.21% 3.38% 4.38%
Food 1.86% 3.62% 2.66%
Animals 0.77% 1.08 % 0.91%
Discriminant 13.76% 17.77% 15.58%
meaningful information from them. Recent work in the field
of computer vision [15], [16] has shown that it is possible
to automatically describe the content of an image accurately
using deep learning. The key idea is to train a deep network
with a large corpus of images for which there is a ground truth
of visible context. The resulting network is then expected to
i) know how to recognize elements appearing in the images
and ii) be capable of generating an adequate description.
For the purpose of this work, we mainly rely on [16] to build
a generative model based on a deep Neural Network (NN).
The system consists of a convolutional NN combined with a
language-generating recurrent NN. The model has been built
using a very extensive dataset distributed by Microsoft called
COCO (Common Objects in Context)3 with over 300,000
images. The output of the system is a meaningful description
of the image given as input.
For each image in a profile, we output the description
that best represents (according to the model) the semantics
involved in the picture. Fig. 4 shows images from four different
profiles, two in the real category and two in the scammer
category. The following descriptions have been automatically
inferred from each of the images:
a) A man riding a motorcycle/bike down a street.
b) A man standing in a boat in the water.
c) A man riding on the back of a brown horse.
d) A man sitting in front of a laptop computer.
It is worth noting the level of detail shown in each caption,
which not only identifies the main actor within the picture (a
man in these cases), but also the backdrop and the activity
being undertaken. Due to space limitations, we refer readers
to the extended version of the paper [12] for further details on
the type of descriptions generated.
There are a number of common topics displayed across
images in both profiles. When looking at the gender of the
people present in the images, we can observe that males appear
in about 60% them as shown in Table II. This matches with
the distribution of gender reported in the profile demographics.
3http://mscoco.org/
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There are also a number of topics slightly more prevalent
in one or the other profile categories, i.e.: group pictures
(including couples), pictures with children, or presence of food
(e.g., wine, bbq, cake). For instance, there are over four times
more group pictures in the scammers category than in the real
one. Contrastingly, the number of images with children in real
profiles is almost double. Combining together all informative
elements of the images, we can observe that about 15% of
images contain descriptions that appear exclusively in one
of the two categories (referred to as ‘discriminant’ profiles
in Table II). This indicates that there is a large number of
images for which their context can be used to characterize
scammers. In other words, scammer profiles feature more
pictures of certain groups. Note that fraudsters frequently
iterate through certain themes known to be appealing (e.g.:
men in uniform). This might also simply be down to the
availability of images which the scammer steals e.g., those
from stock photo databases). The image shown in Fig. 4d, for
instance, is a stock image.
D. Profile Descriptions
Contrary to most real-life encounters, on dating websites,
a user can easily disclose very personal information, such as
their life story, what they are looking for in a partner, their
hobbies, their favorite music, etc., to a complete stranger and
without being interrupted. Moreover, filling in a personal de-
scription is usually highly encouraged by any dating website,
because it can capture other users’ attention and increase the
chances of meeting a user’s ‘perfect match’.
For scammers, however, the profile description provides yet
another means to mislead their victims. Prior research has
shown that they will go to great lengths to create the ‘ideal’
profile, to gain a potential victim’s interest and to maintain
the pretense of a real (online) relationship [5], [17]. As a
result, most scammers in our dataset—5,027 out of 5,402—
attempted to create an attractive user account by advertising
broad pretended interests and characteristics. The real users
were less inclined to provide such personal information: only
5,274 (out of 14,720) generated a profile description.
Recent advances in natural language processing technol-
ogy have enabled researchers to perform automatic linguistic
analyses of lexical, morphological, and syntactic properties
of texts. However, most traditional studies use large sizes
of training data with a limited set of authors/users and
topics, which usually leads to a better performance of the
machine learning algorithms. Profile descriptions are, however,
typically short and can include a whole range of different
topics. With regard to the dataset described in this paper, the
average number of words per profile description was 78.7,
with scammers producing more words on average (104.5) than
genuine users (54.1), This effect is so pronounced that despite
there being fewer scammers than real users, the overall total
of 525,336 words for the scam category was greater than
the 285,407 words for the real category. The finding that
scammers’ profiles have a higher word count compared to
genuine profiles is consistent with previous literature stating
that liars tend to produce more words [18]. To analyze the
ProfileX
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Fig. 5: Key features extracted from dating profiles.
variety of topics that are present in our dataset, we used
dictionary terms that are mapped to categories from the LIWC
2015 dictionary [19]. Category frequencies were recorded for
each profile description. Our results showed that scammers
referred considerably more to emotions—both positive and
negative—than genuine users. Additionally, they use words
related to family, friendship, certainty, males and females
more often, while real users tend to focus on their motives
or drivers (e.g., affiliation, achievement, status, goals), work,
leisure, money, time and space. With regard to language use,
we found that scammers use more formal language forms,
while genuine users displayed more informal language forms
(e.g., Netspeak). A detailed overview of our results can be
found in [12].
III. CLASSIFYING FALSE PROFILES
A high-level overview of our system can be obtained from
Fig. 5. The system is first trained using a dataset of real and
scam profiles. The goal of this phase is to obtain the following
key elements that will later be used to identify fraudsters:
(i) A set of prediction models P = {P1, . . . , Pi } that
output the probability θi(φ1, . . . , φn) = Pi[X = scam |
(φ1, . . . , φn)] of each profile X being scam given a fea-
ture vector (φ1, . . . , φn) obtained from different profile
sections i.
(ii) A weighted model f(P) = ∑wi · Pi that combines all
individual predictions in P . Here, each individual classi-
fier Pi is weighted by wi according to the accuracy given
on a validation set that is different from the training one.
This will also serve as a way to calibrate individual prob-
abilities. The final classifier will then output a decision
based on a vote such that f =
{
scam if f(P) < τ
real otherwise,
where τ is a threshold typically set to
⌊∑
wi
2
⌋
+ 1.
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the model presented in
(ii) as weighted-vote. One can simplify the model by giving
equal weight to all wi (typically wi = 1) and obtaining a
nominal value for Pi before voting. In other words, applying
a threshold for each Pi (e.g., 0.5) and creating an equal
vote among participants. We refer to this non-weighted voting
system as simple-vote.
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A. Feature Engineering
Our work considers a diverse set of features in order to build
a robust classification system. The proposed set of features
contains elements obtained from three different sources: (i)
structured attributes of the profile referred to as demographics
and denoted as θM , (ii) features extracted from raw images
referred to as captions (θC), and (iii) features extracted from
unstructured text (description denoted as θS). Based on the
preprocessing described in Section II, we extract different
types of features: numerical features such as given ages,
categorical features such as gender, and set-based features such
as words in a description. Due to space limitations, we refer the
reader to [12] for a characterization of the full set of features
by the source in the profile.
For θM we considered the age, and the Cartesian location
values as numerical values, while other attributes were treated
as categorical. As described previously, common occupation
responses were grouped into 45 different occupation areas
(e.g., self-employed, military, legal). Long-tail occupation re-
sponses outside of these categories were grouped under other.
In training, no such response appeared more than twice, and
85% of real and 96% of scammer occupations were captured
by known categories.
For θC , after extracting the most representative caption per
image, we removed the least informative elements and retained
only entities (nouns), actions (verbs), and modifiers (adverbs
and adjectives). Each element in the caption was stemmed to a
common base to reduce inflectional forms and derived forms.
Rather than treating the captions as set-based features, we
encoded them as categorical features. Generated captions are
simple and their structure always follows the same pattern. The
presence of a given action and the set of objects appearing in
the image is by itself informative, so encoding the relationship
between the different parts of speech would unnecessarily
increase the number of features.
Finally, we extracted set-based features from the textual
content of the tokenized descriptions (θS). We considered Bag-
of-Words (BOW), word n-grams, character n-grams and LIWC
features. Because word bigrams (n-grams of length n = 2)
yielded the best results during our preliminary experiments
and combining different feature types did not lead to better
classification results, we only included word bigrams in the
rest of the experiments. Additionally, stemming and stop word
removal resulted in a worse performance, so all features were
included in their original form during the experiments.
B. Prediction Models
Because most of the fields are optional, user profiles in
online dating sites are inherently incomplete. Some users are
uncomfortable with high levels of self-disclosure and some are
more interested in contacting others than presenting details
about themselves [20]. Thus, any reliable detection system
should be able to flexibly deal with incomplete profiles.
In this section, we present three independent classifiers to
estimate the presence of fraudulent profiles. Each classifier
is designed to effectively model a section of the profile
(based on θM , θC and θS as described previously). Probability
outputs from each classifier are later combined to provide one
balanced judgement. By using multiple classifiers designed on
individual sections of the profile, we increase the likelihood
that at least one classifier is capable of making an informed
decision. Moreover, ensembles often perform better than single
classifiers [21].
Demographics Classifier: The demographics classifier uses
the greatest variety of original profile attributes. Unlike the
image and description classifiers, handling this feature set
means dealing with non-binary missing data situations—
location and ethnicity might be missing for a given profile
which still contains age and gender information. When no
data is available, the least-informative prior is the base rate of
real vs scam profiles, as is used in the image and description
classifiers. In most situations within the demographics data
more information than this is available, and should be used.
Given problematic randomness assumptions inherent to the
most useful imputation methods for missing data, we opt to
use a Naive Bayesian classifier to handle prediction for profiles
with missing data attributes.
As Naive Bayes is not the most effective classifier for
profiles with all data present—a significant proportion of
the dataset—we also use a more performant classifier which
does not handle cases with missing data. In our case, a
Random Forests model was selected. The final approach to
providing PM (X = scam) is to train a joint Random Forests
and Naive Bayes model, using the high-performing Random
Forests model to make predictions where all demographic data
is available, and the gracefully-degrading Naive Bayes model
for all other cases.
Images Classifier: We build a prediction model based on
the features extracted from the captions of the images such
that PC(X = scam). The architecture of our system is highly
flexible and accepts a wide range of classifiers. Our current
implementation supports Support Vector Machine (SVM),
Random Forests and Extra Randomized Trees. For the purpose
of this paper, we selected SVM with radial kernel as the base
classifier for the images.
SVM has been successfully applied to fraud detection in the
past [22] and has been shown to have better performance com-
pared to 179 classifiers (out of 180) on various datasets [23].
SVM also tends to perform well when the number of samples
is much greater than the number of features, as it is the case
here. In addition, it is less sensitive to data outliers—instead
of minimizing the local error, SVM tries to reduce the upper
bound on the generalization error.
Descriptions Classifier: Previous work [17] has shown that
scammers attempt to keep their labor costs down to be able
to exploit different social media and to continuously produce
the interaction that is required to make their on-going scams
succeed. To achieve this goal, they tend to edit pre-written
scripts that are often shared on underground forums—labeled
by the ethnicity, age group, location and gender of the potential
victim. Hence, for providing PS(X = scam), we compared
the performance of two approaches: (i) a similarity-based
approach, in which we applied shingling (k = 5) to extract the
set of all substrings from each profile description in training
and calculated the Jaccard similarity for each pair of profile
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descriptions (see [24]); and (ii), we trained an SVM algo-
rithm (linear kernel) as implemented in LibShortText [25], an
open-source software package for short-text classification and
analysis. Parameters for both approaches were experimentally
determined on a small subset of each training partition during
cross validation. Within the SVM experiments, features were
represented by TF-IDF scores, which reflect the importance
of each feature (in this case, each word bigram) to a docu-
ment (i.e. a user profile description) in terms of a numerical
frequency statistic over the corpus [24].
Ensemble Classifier: The goal of this method is to combine
the predictions of the base estimators described above to
improve the robustness of the classification. Ensemble methods
are designed to construct a decision based on a set of classifiers
by taking a weighted vote of all available predictions. In
our system, we have a function f that is estimated using an
independent set of samples. This function will then be used
during testing to weight each prediction model Pi such that:
f(PM , PC , PS) = {scam,real}.
For the decision function f we use a Radial Basis Function
(RBF) that measures the distance to the center of the SVM
hyperplane bounding each Pi. This function is defined on
a Euclidean space and it only measures the norm between
that point and the center (without considering the angular
momentum). This function is approximated with the following
form f =
∑
wiδ(||pi||), which can be interpreted as the sum
of the weights wi times the probability score pi ∈ Pi given by
the individual classifiers in the voting system described above.
Single Classifier: We compare the results of our ensemble
method to the predictions made by a single SVM classifier (lin-
ear kernel) in which all demographics, captions and description
features are included in each document instance. Features were
represented by their absolute values and parameters were again
experimentally determined on a small subset of each training
partition during cross validation.
IV. EVALUATION
In evaluating and developing the classification system de-
scribed before, we applied the following methodology.
Methodology: We divided the dataset into a 60% training
set, a 20% test set and a 20% validation set. Profiles were
assigned to each set randomly under a constraint preventing
variants of the same scam profile from being assigned dif-
ferent sets or folds. Development of the classification system
proceeded as follows:
1) Each component classifier was designed within the 60%
training set, and individual performance levels established
through ten-fold cross-validation within this set.
2) Once classifier design was complete, each component
classifier was trained on the full training set.
3) Each classifier produced probabilities and labels for the
test set. The ensemble was developed on these probabil-
ities, and performance was established through five-fold
cross-validation on the test set.
4) Based on performance within the test set, the ensemble
model and the choice of outcomes to report within the
validation set was decided.
TABLE III: Final results for each component classifier, simple
majority voting, a similarity-only approach, a single classifier
using all features, and the weighted-vote ensemble.
CLASSIFIER TN FN FP TP PREC. REC. F1 ACC
demographics 2725 196 149 903 0.858 0.822 0.840 0.913
captions 2872 499 2 600 0.997 0.546 0.705 0.874
description 2758 215 116 884 0.884 0.804 0.842 0.917
similarity-only 2939 435 28 571 0.953 0.568 0.712 0.884
simple-vote 2870 189 4 910 0.996 0.828 0.904 0.951
single 2820 108 54 1027 0.950 0.905 0.927 0.959
weighted-vote 2834 78 40 1021 0.962 0.929 0.945 0.970
Excluding new variants
demographics 2725 122 149 569 0.792 0.823 0.808 0.924
captions 2872 378 2 313 0.994 0.453 0.622 0.893
description 2758 119 116 572 0.831 0.828 0.830 0.934
simple-vote 2870 129 4 562 0.993 0.813 0.894 0.963
weighted-vote 2818 53 56 638 0.919 0.923 0.921 0.969
Excluding all variants
demographics 2707 114 167 577 0.776 0.835 0.804 0.921
captions 2874 426 0 265 1.000 0.384 0.554 0.881
description 2731 171 143 520 0.784 0.753 0.768 0.912
simple-vote 2860 159 14 532 0.974 0.770 0.860 0.951
single 2829 98 45 592 0.929 0.858 0.892 0.960
weighted-vote 2841 69 33 622 0.950 0.900 0.924 0.971
5) For final validation, individual classifiers were trained on
the training set, produced probabilities and labels for the
testing set and the validation set, the ensemble model was
trained on the probabilities given for the test set, and its
predictions taken for the validation set.
6) A single classifier was trained on the combination of the
training and test data and evaluated on the validation set.
A. Classification Results
We present our results together a discussion of the most
informative features. Due to space limitations, we refer the
readers to the extended version of this paper [12] for a number
of case studies, covering (i) real profiles misclassified (FP),
and (ii) scam profiles misclassified (FN). We also provide a
lengthy discussion of the true positive (TP) and true negative
(TN) reported by our classifier.
Summary: Table III presents the results within the validation
set for each classifier, for simple majority voting between all
three classifier outputs, and for the SVM ensemble model
trained on the classifier probabilities given for the test set.
Precision, recall and F1 are given for predicting scam profiles
(the minority class). Judging performance by F1, the best
individual classifier was the SVM description classifier (F1
= 0.842). As can be expected, the similarity-based approach
(threshold Jaccard similarity of 0.259) yielded a high precision
score, but a low recall score, which resulted in a markedly
lower F1 of 0.712. The demographics classifier was the next
best component classifier (F1 = 0.840), but the captions
classifier was highly precise, making only two false-positive
judgements. Simple majority voting between classifier labels
improved performance significantly compared to any individ-
ual classifier, raising F1 to 0.904, with a precision of 0.996.
A single classifier using all features outperformed majority
voting (F1 = 0.927). The ensemble system outperformed
both the single classifier and majority voting at 0.945 F1,
significantly improving recall whilst maintaining a high level
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Fig. 6: ROC for the ensemble classifier.
of precision. Over 97% of all profiles were classified correctly.
Fig. 6 characterises the ROC performance for this ensemble
by whether variants (near-duplicate profiles) were excluded.
Feature Analysis: We describe some of the most important
features as identified by our classifiers.
Table IVa presents the total decrease in node impurities
from splitting on the each feature in the RF component of
the demographics model, averaged over all trees. The most
important feature was the occupation area reported in the
profile. Node purity rankings are known to bias towards
factors with many levels, but the size of the interval between
the occupation area and the other features suggests that this
ranking is genuine. This agrees with our observations in II-B
about the use of occupation area as an attractive status marker.
Table IVb presents the highest-weighted bigrams from the
descriptions classifier for the purpose of predicting the scam
category. The most informative features tend to relate to
nonfluencies in English (starting descriptions with ‘Im’ or
‘Am’, constructs like ‘by name’) and attempts to overtly signal
a romantic or trustworthy nature (e.g.,“caring”, “passionate”,
“loving”). Our extended version of the paper [12] provide a
topic analysis that also captures this tendency of scam profiles
to include more emotive language.
Table IVc presents the most discriminant features for the
captions classifier. Features with a negative weight are more
informative when discriminating real profiles. Instead, features
with positive weight relate to scam profiles. Interestingly, some
of the top elements embedded in the images map with relevant
traits observed in the demographics such as the occupation
(e.g., military) or the gender (e.g., male) c.f. §II-B.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we established the need for a systematic ap-
proach that automates online romance scammer detection. The
system we presented is a key first step in developing automated
tools that are able to assist both dating site administrators and
end-users in identifying fraudsters before they can cause any
harm to their victims. However, there are risks in deploying
such automated systems, principally: i) Risk of denying the
service to legitimate users; ii) Risk of having scammers that
TABLE IV: Top-ranked features for component classifiers
(a) Feature ranking de-
mograpics RF
feature purity
occupation 332.70
latitude 198.02
status 128.76
longitude 128.71
age 114.24
ethnicity 110.53
gender 64.52
(b) Top-weighted bigrams
for scam descriptions
bigram weight
<start> im 0.3086
don t 0.2318
caring and 0.1776
and caring 0.1674
by name 0.1644
<start> am 0.1643
am just 0.1641
that will 0.1572
am here 0.1568
tell you 0.1481
(c) Feature raking cap-
tions
Keyword weight
pizza -1.0
picture -0.52
child -0.50
bottle -0.46
christmas -0.46
driving 1.0
military 1.0
birthday 2.0
group 2.46
male 2.95
have evaded the system. We discuss how these concerns may
be addressed in [12].
A. Evasion
We have compared our results with the justifications pre-
sented by the moderators who identified the scammers in [12].
We see that moderators heavily rely on certain features, such
as the IP address, that can easily be obscured. Moderators
also check if the IP address is known to belong to a proxy.
Although this could certainly be used as a feature in our
system, scammers could use unregistered proxies (as yet
inexpensive) or compromised hosts in residential IP address
space to evade detection. Conversely, our system relies on a
wide range of features that are more difficult to evade, such
as textual features4; or features which might render a profile
unattractive if obfuscated (e.g., demographics or images).
A natural scammer response to this kind of profile detection
could be to cease hand-crafting unusually attractive or targeted
profiles, and instead turn to cloning the existing profiles of
real users from different dating sites. By preferentially cloning
attractive profiles, they would retain the high match-rate which
enables contact with potential victims, and by using real users’
profile information they would avoid detection systems geared
towards their own idiosyncratic profile elements. Scammers
are already partially engaging in this sort of behaviour when
they re-use images of real people taken from the web.
The solution to such a development will rely on the de-
ployment of profile-cloning detection systems, such as that
described by Kontaxis et al. [28], perhaps augmented by
behavioural classifiers operating on e.g., the language used
in messages.
B. Limitations & Deployment Considerations
There are limitations to our work which must be borne
in mind. Firstly, whilst we have taken pains to make use
of profile features which should be visible on other dating
platforms, we have not yet tested our classification approach
on profiles from other dating sites. It may be the case that
scammers and/or real users show different characteristics in
4Prior work has shown that a combination of unconsciously made linguistic
decisions is identifiable [26], [27]
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different dating platforms, which would limit the applicability
of our method. We are currently seeking other sources of user
profile data to investigate this possibility. More information on
scammer/user traits could generally inform ongoing research
into—and prevention of—online dating fraud.
Secondly, our results show a number of false negative classi-
fications. Further inspection of the data on scammers suggests
that augmenting our approach with other classifiers—such as
ones using geolocated IP addresses or observations of on-
platform behavior (e.g., messaging)—could help capture these
scammers where the public profile information is inconclusive.
Online dating sites can deploy a detection system such as
ours on their premises at the profile registration stage. Security
administrators would then be responsible for validating and
acting upon the classification system’s output. How dating sites
can responsibly anticipate and respond to errors in automated
classification systems such as this is a point of policy on which
industry insight would be highly valuable. More generally,
this raises the issue of accountability under the EU General
Data Protection Regulation, and the “right to explanation” of
algorithmic decisions that significantly affect a user.
In the case where our system is deployed locally, the
implications of our decisions can have a paramount effect
on the user. Suppose that our system predicts that a given
scam profile is safe. This might give the user a false sense
of security, and encourage them into beginning a relationship
with less caution than they would have applied otherwise.
Designing a tool which protects users while minimizing the
risk of blind trust is a challenging interface design problem,
but one which is outside the scope of this paper.
VI. RELATED WORK
Despite the rapidly increasing number of victims [29],
previous work on online dating fraud is limited, focussing on
case studies [30], interviews with online dating site users about
their security practices [31] and interview and questionnaire-
based psychological profiling of victims [11], [5], [4].
Three recent studies provide insight into romance scammer
strategies. The authors of [17] carried out a study on Craigslist
to identify common methods of romance scammers responding
to honeypot adverts. Alongside identifying approaches outside
of traditional trust-building relationship-oriented scammers
(including driving users to other platforms and delivering
hooks for premium-rate numbers), they observed scammers
were mostly West African in origin, and used scraped images
of attractive women [17]. Huang et al. [6] performed a large-
scale study of dating profiles that are used by scammers,
covering 500,000 scam accounts from an anonymous Chinese
online dating site. They found that different types of scam-
mers target different audiences and that advanced scammers
are more successful in attracting potential victims’ attention.
Finally, the authors of [8] describe geographic variation in
dating fraud profiles, and propose a set of methods to improve
geolocation when attackers are hiding behind proxies. While
assisting in attribution of origins, these methods cannot be
used for scammer detection.
Although a number of solutions based on machine learning
techniques already exist to detect malicious activity on online
services (e.g., detection of spam [32], [33], [34], or false
identities [27], [35]), to our knowledge, no prior work has
attempted to automatically detect romance scammers. One of
the main reasons for this is that the dynamics of dating web-
sites make scam detection more difficult than in other domains,
such as email or social networking. The intended operation of
a dating site is that previously unconnected users will reach
out and initiate contact with people they do not know, and so
spontaneous, unsolicited communications cannot be viewed as
a reliable signal of malicious behavior. Activities that in other
areas might be considered suspicious—contacting many users,
providing false profile attributes, migrating conversations to
other media—could all also be considered normal behavior
amongst dating site users [6]. Moreover, romance scams are
for the most part carried out by humans, adapting to changing
circumstances, and so approaches which rely on detecting bot-
like behavior are similarly stymied. In this paper, we address
these issues by analyzing the launching point for the scam—
the user profile.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented the first framework system-
atizing the identification of false online dating personas. Our
exploratory analysis identified the sugarcoated lures used on
fraudulent profiles. By analyzing the prevalence of these traits
with respect to legitimate profiles, we engineered a diverse
discriminatory feature set, using state-of-the-art text and image
processing from multiple profile segments. This feature set
allowed us to develop a set of independent classification
systems which adjust to the omission of profile details.
Our experimental results show that our system can accu-
rately detect online dating fraud profiles, with high precision.
A case by case analysis of our results, however, indicates that
there are certain false profiles that look genuinely real. For
these cases, we have noted that other sources of information,
such as the messages exchanged, could be very informative.
As future directions, we aim to more broadly examine the
available data on online dating fraud, seeking information
actionable for enforcement and other countermeasures. We
also hope to explore the question of how, at a local level,
interventions designed to warn and protect users from scam-
mers can avoid forming dependences that reduce awareness.
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